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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case
Petitioner Thompson Creek Mining Company ("Thompson Creek") challenges the

decision of the Director of the Respondent Idaho Department of Water Resources (the "Director"
or the "Department") to create Water District No. 170 ("WDl 70"). WDl 70 includes the upper
portions of the Salmon River Basin in the Department's administrative basins 71 and 72. 1 The
Director violated the Due Process clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions and
applicable requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (the "Idaho APA"). Idaho
law specifically requires that a water district may be formed only when one is "required in order
to properly administer uses of the water resource." However, the administrative record contains
virtually no evidence to support the Director's decision to create WDl 70.
The primary citation in the administrative record to justify creation of WD 170 is a
settlement agreement concerning federal instream water rights. By improperly fixating on that
agreement, the Director violated the Due Process rights of Thompson Creek and other affected
water users in two ways. First, the agreement biased the Director in favor of creating WD 170
prior to a hearing, because he wrongly believed he was required to create the water district.
Second, the Director's improper fixation upon the requirements of the agreement deprived the
general public and the affected water users of the opportunity to provide meaningful input

' A map depicting the geographic scope ofWD170 is available on Vol. 3, p. 580 of the
Record, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1.
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regarding the necessity for the water district, because Department personnel repeatedly informed
interested parties that the agreement required the Department to create WD 170.
The decision to create WD 170 should be reversed. However, if the Court affirms
creation ofWDl 70, it should exclude Thompson Creek from it. Thompson Creek executed a
separate, judicially approved settlement and cannot be bound by the subsequent agreement,
especially its provision requiring creation ofWDl 70.

B.

Course And Disposition Of Proceedings Below
Thompson Creek argued its appeal of the Department's creation ofWDl 70 before the

district court on November 21, 2007. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision
denying Thompson Creek's request for relief and upholding the Department's creation of
WDl 70 on February 22, 2008.

C.

Statement Of Facts
1.

Water Districts Generally

This action challenges the Director's creation ofWDl 70 in Basins 71 and 72 of the
Upper Salmon River Basin. The general purpose of a water district, if one is required, is to
regulate distribution of water pursuant to Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine after water rights
have been adjudicated. See l.C. § 42-602. Because of substantial costs and imposition of
significant governmental restrictions upon private property rights protected by our constitutions,
Thompson Creek believes the creation of a water district should be subject to careful scrutiny.

If formed, a water district must hire a watermaster and assistants to oversee distribution
of water within the district. LC. §§ 42-605(3), 42-610. The district pays the watermaster,

2
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acquires property, collects data, measures water, controls water delivery, and keeps records.
LC. § 42-605A(3). In this particular case, water district formation also involves the purchase,
installation, maintenauce, aud repair oflockable headgates and measuring devices by water
users. (R., Vol. 3, p. 579.)
The district water users must pay these costs. LC. §§ 42-605A(3), 42-610. In fact, a
water user's share of the district's expenses becomes a personal debt, aud the water district may
file an action to collect such amounts. LC.§§ 42-612(4), 42-613, 42-616. Also, failure to pay
the assessments cau mean shut off of water deliveries. LC. §§ 42-617, 42-618.
WDl 70 encompasses the Upper Salmon River Basin, described by the Department as
administrative basins 71 and 72. Except for a few water users in three small, pre-existing water
districts in Basin 72, the vast majority of water users in these two basins have never been
subjected to the governmental costs or restrictions of a water district.
Recognizing the burdens on water users, the Idaho Legislature granted the Director
authority to create a water district only when it is "required in order to properly administer uses
of the water resources." LC. § 42-604, ,r 2 (emphasis added). So, creation of a water district cau
only be justified from a water resource management perspective and this maudatory element is
essential. The Record in this case reflects nothing to demonstrate satisfaction of this statutory
requirement.

3
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2.

The Snake River Basin Adjudication And The Wild And Scenic Rivers
Agreement

This dispute arises in the context of the Snake River Basin Adjudication (the "SRBA"),
which the State ofldaho began in 1987 to adjudicate the water rights within Idaho's Snake River
basin. See 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 18, § 1, as amended by 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.118,
§ 1, and 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 454, § 11. Generally speaking, the SRBA process consists

of these sequential steps within each administrative basin:
(1) the filing of claims by those who claim to own water rights within the particular
basin;
(2) the investigation of those claims by the Department;
(3) the issuance by the Department of a "Director's Report" providing
recommendations to the SRBA District Court in Twin Falls (the "SRBA Court")
regarding how the water rights claimed should be decreed;
(4) an objection period;
(5) a judicial process for resolving any objections to the Director's Report; and
( 6) the issuance of partial decrees for water rights within the basin.
See generally l.C. §§ 42-1409-42-1413.

During the SRBA, the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"), submitted claims
to instream water rights in central Idaho, including the main stem of the Salmon River, claiming
all of the Salmon River's unappropriated flows. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 853-54, 856-57, 859-60);
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912,913, 12 P.3d 1256, 1257 (Idaho 2000). 2 The

2

The Idaho Supreme Court's Potlatch opinion arose out of the same SRBA subcase that
generated the "Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement." As Sections V.B and V.C of this Brief
explain, and as the Record in this case explicitly demonstrates, that Agreement was the

4
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basis for these claims was the federal Wild & Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-1287. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 853, 856.) Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 912, 12 P.3d at 1256. The
Forest Service claimed the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act grants the federal government instream
water rights for "wild and scenic" rivers to preserve their scenic, recreational, fish and wildlife
values. (R., Vol. 5, p. 860.) Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 914-16, 12 P.3d at 1258-60; see also 16
U.S.C. §§ 1271, 1284(c).
Importantly, Basin 72-the administrative basin in which Thompson Creek owns
multiple water rights--encompasses part of the upper portion of the main stem of the Salmon
River and is upstream of the areas of the Forest Service instream water rights claims. Because of
its location, Thompson Creek legitimately feared that if the Forest Service obtained instream
water rights, it would force shut off of water diversions by Thompson Creek and other Basin 72
water users during water shortage. Accordingly, Thompson Creek objected to the Forest Service
claims. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 869-74, 876-82); Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 913, 12 P.3d at 1257. Other
water users and the State of Idaho also objected, and the dispute became consolidated subcase
number 75-13316 before the SRBA Court. Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 912-13, 12 P.3d at 1256-57.
On May 29, 1998, Thompson Creek and the Forest Service entered into a settlement
subordinating any claimed instream water rights to Thompson Creek's water rights. (R., Vol. 4,
pp. 689-706.) The SRBA Court approved this stipulation on June 16, 1998. (R., Vol. 4,

Director's entire basis for creating WDI 70. Accordingly, Potlatch provides a helpful
explanation of the legal background of the federal government's SRBA claims to instream flow
water rights under the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act and, ultimately, of the creation ofWDI 70.

5
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pp. 708-11.) Because the settlement only involved the Forest Service and Thompson Creek,
several objectors to the Wild & Scenic River Act claims remained, and the litigation continued.'
Finally, on August 20, 2004, the Forest Service and the remaining objectors, including
the State of Idaho, entered into and filed a Stipulation and Joint Motion for Order Approving
Stipulation and Entry ofPartial Decrees, purporting to resolve the dispute over the federal

claims. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712-39.) This stipulation is known as the "Wild & Scenic Rivers
Agreement" (the "W&SR Agreement" or "Agreement").
Because Thompson Creek already had settled its dispute over the claims, it was not a
party to the W &SR Agreement. In fact, on October 14, 2004, Thompson Creek filed a timely
objection (and memorandum in support thereof) to the W&SR Agreement. (R., Vol. 5,
pp. 884-87.) Thompson Creek objected to the Agreement on several bases, including that the
Agreement "calls for the management and distribution of water by means contrary to Idaho law."
Id.

Thompson Creek primarily objected to Paragraph 2 of the Agreement. In that detailed
provision, the State ofldaho agreed to perform extensive water right administration and
enforcement duties. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712, 714-18.) In particular, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement
provides that:
3

Significantly, the SRBA District Court approved this settlement despite the objection of
the State ofldaho. See State ofldaho's Response Memorandum to the United States/Thompson
Creek Motion to Approve Stipulation, In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 63-25239,
75-13316 and 75-13605 (5th Dist. June 12, 1998), attached hereto as Addendum 2. This Court
may take judicial notice of this SRBA filing pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, and
Thompson Creek hereby requests the Court to do so.

6
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IDWR will establish a water district for the Upper Salmon River Basin.
The Upper Salmon Water District (the "USWD") shall initially consist of
administrative basins 71 and 72, those basins for which Director's Reports
have been filed for irrigation and other water rights. Within six months of
the filing of Director's Reports for administrative basins 73, 74 and 75, the
parties will file a joint petition with the SRBA Court, pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 42-1417, for an order for interim administration of those basins
and IDWR will incorporate those basins into the USWD. Existing water
districts within the basins will be converted to subdistricts within the
USWD as appropriate to facilitate management.
(R., Vol. 4, p. 715) (emphasis added).
The SRBA Court approved the W&SR Agreement on November 17, 2004 (the "W&SR
Order"). (R., Vol. 4, pp. 781-85.) However, in response to Thompson Creek's objections, the
W &SR Order contained provisions restricting the application and enforcement of the Agreement.
(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83.) Critically important to the case before this Court, the W &SR Order
contains the following restrictions:
The (W&SR Agreement] is hereby approved, provided, that the provisions
of paragraph 2 of the [Agreement] ("paragraph 2") that address
administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties
only and shall not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with
regard to administration of water rights by IDWR.
(R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). The Order goes on to provide that:
The provisions of paragraph 2 [of the W&SR Agreement] shall not affect
the rights of Thompson Creek or any other non-signatory party to
participate in and object to any ... proceeding for creation of a water
district ... ; nor shall the provisions ofparagraph 2 affect the disposition

or review of such proceedings.
(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83) (emphasis added).

7
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3.

Next Step: The Director's Creation Of WDl 70

Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the W &SR Agreement, the Department took the first
procedural step toward creating WDl 70 when it filed a motion for "interim administration" with
the SRBA Court on May 13, 2005. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 371-80.) Generally speaking, interim
administration is an intermediate step that may be requested by the Department after water rights
within a particular area have been adjudicated, but before creation of a water district. See
LC.§ 42-1417. It allows the Department to administer water rights much as a watermaster
would do if a water district were already in place. See id. at §§ 42-607, 42-1417(1 ). However,
as will be discussed more fully in this Brief, legal standards for interim administration are less
stringent than those for the formation of a water district. And, interim administration does not
actually provide a basis for creating a water district. The Department's request for interim
administration was unopposed, and the SRBA Court approved the motion for interim
administration on September 29, 2005. (R., Vol. II, pp. 457-60.)
During this period, the Department coordinated meetings of the WDl 70 Steering
Committee, composed of Department representatives and local water users. This Committee
convened on September 13, 2005; October 4, 2005; and December 14, 2005. (R., Vol. 3,
pp. 425,461, 490.) At these meetings, the Committee members (including Department
personnel) discussed the purpose and background ofWDI 70, general responsibilities and
activities of a water district, the organization, governance, and financing ofWDI 70, and related
issues. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 425-29, 461-66, 490-92.)

8
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On November 9, 2005, the Director conducted the statutorily required hearing regarding
creation ofWDl 70. At the hearing, five individuals testified, none of whom expressed support
for WDl 70. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 348-61.) However, allegedly based on the hearing testimony and
the rest of the administrative record, the Director issued the Final Order Creating Water District
No. 170 on March 6, 2006. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 494-506.) Thompson Creek filed a Petition for
Reconsideration of the Final Order Creating Water District No. 170 on March 17, 2006.
(R., Vol. 3, pp. 536-51.) In response, the Director issued an Amended Final Order Creating
Water District No. 170 on April 6, 2006 (the "WDl 70 Order"). (R., Vol. 3, pp. 565-81.)
Thompson Creek timely filed its petition for judicial review with the district court on
May 1, 2006.

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Given this legal context and the factual background previously described, the issues to be
decided on appeal are:
(1) Whether the Director's failure to record and provide a transcript of the entire
hearing regarding the creation ofWDl 70 violates Due Process principles and
provisions of the Idaho AP A;
(2) Whether the Director was biased in favor of creating WD 170, in violation of Due
Process principles and provisions of the Idaho AP A;
(3) Whether the Director's representations to the public that he was required to create
WD 170 pursuant to a previous agreement violate Due Process principles and
provisions of the Idaho AP A;
(4) Whether the agency record contains substantial evidence that WDI 70 is "required
in order to properly administer uses of the water resource," as mandated by Idaho
Code Section 42-604 and provisions of the Idaho APA;

9
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(5) Whether inclusion of Thompson Creek within WDl 70 violates contract principles
and therefore violates provisions of the Idaho APA;
(6) Whether Thompson Creek is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

III.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Thompson Creek is claiming attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides this Court
with the statutory authority to award attorney fees "in any administrative or civil proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency ... and a person." LC. § 12-117(1 ). Such an award
acts "as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action" and provides "a remedy for persons
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Reardon v. Magic Valley

Sand & Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340,343 (2004) (quoting Bogner v. State
Dep 't ofRevenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984)).
To determine whether an award of attorney fees under Section 12-117 is appropriate, the
Court must (I) find a prevailing party, and (2) find that the other party "acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law." Id.; see also, Reardon, 140 Idaho at 118, 90 P.3d at 343.
"Where an agency has no authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis
in fact or law." Id. at 120, 90 P.3d at 345. See also, Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd. of

Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808,812, 153 P.3d 1154 (2007) (awarding attorney fees under§ 12-117
because county had no authority to take action on an indigency application "without first
fulfilling the procedural requirements set forth in the medical indigency statutes").

10
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Here, the Director "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law" because he did not
have the authority to create WD 170 without meeting the necessary procedural requirements. The
Director violated Thompson Creek's Due Process rights and made a decision that is not
supported by substantial evidence on the record. Thompson Creek brought these issues to the
attention of the Director during the original administrative proceedings, which the Director
summarily rejected. Because the Director acted outside of his authority in the creation of
WD170, the Court should award attorney fees to Thompson Creek ifit is successful on this
appeal.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A successful challenge of the Director's administrative order under the Idaho AP A
requires Thompson Creek to prevail on two points. See, e.g., Barron v. Idaho Dep 't of Water

Res., 135 Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (Idaho 2001). First, Thompson Creek must
demonstrate the Department violated a standard in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3). Id. In this
case, Thompson Creek must demonstrate that the Department's actions were:
(!) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(5) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

I.C. § 67-5279(3).

11

C!lent:966775.5

Second, Thompson Creek must demonstrate that its substantial rights have been
prejudiced by the Department's action. LC.§ 67-5279(4).
This Court has free review of issues of Jaw and is in no way bound by any of the legal
conclusions of the district court. See, e.g., Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433,435 4 P.3d
545, 547 (2000) (the Idaho Supreme Court "freely reviews issues oflaw"); V-1 Oil Company v.
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519,521 (2000) (the Idaho Supreme Court

"reviews a lower court's statutory interpretation de nova" and "[b]ecause constitutional questions
are purely questions oflaw, they are also reviewed de nova"); Basic American, Inc. v. Shatila,
133 Idaho 726, 733-34, 992 P.2d 175, 182-83 (1999) (Idaho Supreme Court "is not bound by
legal conclusions of the trial court and is free to draw its own legal conclusions from the facts
presented"). In addition, this Court has free review over whether an agency's statutory
interpretation should be afforded deference. See, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn,
141 Idaho 388,398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005).

v.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Director's Failure To Transcribe The Entire Hearing Violates Idaho Statutory
Requirements And Due Process Principles
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "in violation

of ... statutory provisions," or if it is "made upon unlawful procedure." LC. § 67-5279(3)(a),
(c). Idaho statute specifically requires the entire administrative hearing to be recorded by that
agency. LC.§ 67-5242(3)(d). The failure to do so is a violation ofldaho statute and constitutes
unlawful procedure and is, therefore, a violation of the Idaho AP A.
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In addition, pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "in violation of
constitutional ... provisions." LC. § 67-5279(3)(a). Both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions guarantee that no party shall be deprived of its property "without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I; IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 13. Under Idaho law, water rights
are entitled to Due Process protection, including during the creation of a water district. Nettleton

v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 90, 94,558 P.2d 1048, 1051, 1055 (Idaho 1977).
Simply put, the Director did not record the entire hearing regarding the creation of
WDl 70 and therefore violated the Idaho APA and the Due Process clauses. The public notice
provided by the Department regarding the WDl 70 hearing plainly states that the hearing was to
take place at "7:00 PM, November 9, 2005 at the Challis High School Cafeteria .... " (R.,
Vol. 3, p. 467) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Director specifically stated at the hearing that,

"ft/his meeting began shortly after 7:00 p.m ...." (R., Vol. 2, p. 350, L. 8) (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, the Director ''went on the record at approximately 8: 10 p.m." (R., Vol. 2,
p. 350, LL. 7-8.) Accordingly, based upon the Director's own testimony, there were at least 70
unrecorded minutes of the hearing that are not a part of the hearing transcript. And, the Director
has judicially admitted that this unrecorded portion included a description of the "factors he
considered in proposing to establish the Upper Salmon Water District and answering questions
about the establishment of the district and how it was envisioned to function." (R., Vol. 5,
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pp. 895, 902.) This is a plain violation of Section 67-5242(3)(d) which unequivocally states that
the Director "[s]hall cause the hearing to be recorded .... " 4
In addition to violating Section 67-5242(3)(d), the Department's action violated the Due
Process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Idaho case law has specifically stated that
"a transcribable record [is] indispensable to meaningful judicial review," and that "the keeping of
a transcribable record" is one of the procedural requirements that collectively "comprise a
common core of procedural due process requirements ...." Gay v. County Comm 'rs of
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,651 P.2d 560, 563 (Idaho App. 1982). While Gay was
decided in the context of a zoning proceeding, the court's statements apply equally to state
administrative agency proceedings, as both are subject to Due Process.
While Idaho appellate courts apparently have not specifically described the standards that
govern the adequacy of a hearing transcript, at least one federal court of appeals has stated that
"[w]hether the transcript is inadequate depends upon the materiality of the omissions." McGlone
v. Heckler, 791 F.2d 1119, 1120 (4th Cir. 1986). The Director admitted the unrecorded portion
of the hearing includes a discussion of the factors he considered in proposing to establish
WDl 70. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 895, 902.) Therefore, that portion of the hearing was certainly

"material."

4

Significantly, this Court has previously reversed the Department for violating the
mandatory statutory due process requirements of Idaho law. In Nettleton, the Court reversed the
Department's action combining two water districts because it totally failed to conduct the
mandatory hearing. In its holding, the Court admonished the Department to follow the due
process requirements ofldaho law. See Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94.
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Were this a situation in which the beginning of the hearing had been delayed
until 8:10 p.m., this would excuse the Director's failure to go on the record until that time. That
was not the case. Both the public notice announcing the hearing and the Director's direct
testimony establish that the hearing commenced at 7:00 p.m. Therefore, the proceedings
between 7:00 p.m. and 8: 10 p.m. were required to be recorded and transcribed. They were not.
The Director violated state law.
This violation prejudiced Thompson Creek by depriving it of the ability to discover and
understand all of the "factors" considered by the Director in creating WDl 70. More critically, it
deprives Thompson Creek of"meaningful judicial review" because there is no way for this Court
to determine what additional evidence was presented during that 70 minute span or what
additional Due Process violations occurred, if any.

B.

The Director's Belief That Creation Of WDI 70 Was Required By A Previous
Agreement Deprived Thompson Creek Of Its Due Process Rights
The Idaho AP A mandates that an agency action is in error if it is "in violation of ...

constitutional provisions" or ifit is "made upon unlawful procedure." LC.§ 67-5279(3)(a), (c).
Both the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions guarantee that no party shall be deprived of its property
"without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Again,
under Idaho law, water rights are entitled to Due Process protection. Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 90,
558 P.2d at 1051.
When he created WD 170, the Director believed the W &SR Agreement required him to
create WD 170, regardless of whether the administrative record demonstrated a legitimate need
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for it. This violated Due Process requirements in two ways. First, it rendered the Director a
biased decision-maker. Second, it deprived water users of the opportunity to provide meaningful
input regarding the creation ofWDl 70. This error prejudiced Thompson Creek because it
deprived Thompson Creek of a fair opportunity to have its concerns about WDl 70 considered in
a meaningful way. Because the Director's creation ofWDl 70 violated Due Process
requirements and was made upon unlawful procedure, his actions also violated the Idaho AP A.
1.

The State Of Idaho Did Not Have Authority To Require The Director To
Create A New Water District At The Time Of The W&SR Agreement

As discussed more fully below, the Director's primary justification for creating WDI 70
is the W&SR Agreement. Paragraph 2 of that Agreement states the Department "will establish a
water district for the Upper Salmon River Basin." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712, 715.) However, at the
time it executed the W&SR Agreement, the State of Idaho did not have the authority to
unilaterally create, or agree to create, WD 170. Rather, at most, the state had authority to require
the Director to initiate proper administrative proceedings to determine whether creating the new
water district was legally justified under applicable Idaho statutes.
The Department, as a state administrative agency, has only those powers specifically
granted by the Idaho Legislature. This Court specifically addressed the powers of the
Department by stating, "[ a]n administrative agency like the [Department] has only such powers
as the statute or ordinance confers .... " Beker Indus. Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation Dist., 101
Idaho 187,191,610 P.2d 546,550 (Idaho 1980) (citations omitted). This Court has also stated
that, "[ a]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority
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granted it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or
enlarge the legislative act which it administers." Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514,
915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Idaho 1996).
By its express terms, Section 42-604 only allows the Director to create a new water
district when he has determined, after notice and a hearing in compliance with statutory and
Due Process requirements, that the new district is "required in order to properly administer uses
of the water resource." LC.§ 42-604, ,i,i 2, 3; see also Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94,558 P.2d
at 1055 ( confirming that the combining of two separate water districts into one water district
requires notice, a hearing, and adherence to procedural due process). At the time of the W&SR
Agreement, there had not yet been any notice or hearing on creation of a water district, as
required by Section 42-604. Accordingly, the Director could not have been required to actually
create WDI 70 at that time, regardless of the wording of the W&SR Agreement. State Jaw did
not authorize him to do so at that point.

2.

Due Process Requires An Unbiased Decision-Maker

As this Brief has already explained, water rights are entitled to Due Process protections in
Idaho, including during the creation of a water district. And, as this Court has recognized, "[t]he
Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal." Eacret v.

Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494,498 (Idaho 2004) (citing Marshall v. Jerrica,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (I 980)). An administrative agency violates these Due Process
requirements if it "is 'not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its
own circumstances."' Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785, 86 P .3d at 499 (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch.
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Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass 'n, 426 U.S. 482,493 (1941)). More specifically, the agency

action is invalid if prehearing statements by the decision-maker demonstrate that (i) the
decision-maker "has made up his or her mind regarding the facts and will not listen to the
evidence with an open mind," (ii) the decision-maker "will not apply the existing law,'' or
(iii) the decision-maker "has already made up his or her mind regarding the outcome of the
hearing." Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785-86, 86 P.3d at 499-500 (emphasis added).
This Court has illustrated the operation of these principles in its Eacret opinion. In
Eacret, landowners on Lake Pend Oreille applied to Bonner County for a variance from setback

requirements in order to build a boathouse. Eacret, 139 Idaho at 782, 86 P.3d at 496.
Ultimately, after an appeal from a denial by the Planning and Zoning Commission, the Board of
County Commissioners approved the variance. Id. Prior to the hearing before the Board,
however, one of the Board members indicated his belief that variances for boathouses such as the
one contemplated by the application should be approved by stating, among other things, that "we
need to grant these variances." 139 Idaho at 785, 786, 86 P.3d at 499, 500.
Based upon these statements, together with some ex parte communications between the
same Board member and the applicants, the Court upheld the district court's finding of improper
bias because it appeared that the Board member had already made up his mind on the variance
application prior to the hearing. 139 Idaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500. In doing so, the court
specifically noted that there are two purposes of these Due Process requirements: (1) to reduce
the chance of an unfair decision, and (2) to reduce the appearance of impropriety. 139 Idaho
at 784, 86 P.3d at 498. See also Floyd v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,
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52 P.3d 863 (Idaho 2002) (finding bias based upon public statements made by a county
commissioner, but also finding harmless error because the board vote was unanimous).
The Eacret and Floyd cases demonstrate that having a biased decision maker necessarily
violates Due Process. While in Floyd the bias was ultimately found to be harmless error, that
reasoning does not apply in the case currently before this Court. Rather, the decision to create
WDl 70 was that of one person: the Director. His vote was not the "swing" vote, it was the only
vote. Accordingly, any biased decision on the part of the Director is necessarily a Due Process
violation that cannot be upheld under a harmless error analysis.

3.

The Director Was A Biased Decision-Maker Because He Believed The
W&SR Agreement Required Him To Create WD170

With respect to the dispute currently before this Court, the administrative record
demonstrates that the Director and other Department personnel believed the W&SR Agreement
required them to create WD 170. Regardless of whether the Director may have acted in good
faith throughout the administrative proceedings, his belief that he was required to create WD 170
demonstrates that the Director "ha[d] already made up his ... mind regarding the outcome of the
hearing,"which under Eacret, invalidates his action. 139 Idaho at 785-786, 86 P.3d at499-500.
The administrative record is replete with statements made by Department personnel
demonstrating their belief that the W &SR Agreement required the Director to form WD 170.
For example, at the first WDI 70 Steering Committee meeting, Department employee Tim Luke
presented slides specifically stating that, "IDWR must establish [the] Upper Salmon Water
District." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 609,612) (emphasis added). Additional slides presented by the
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Department's current Director David Tuthill at an October 24, 2005 public information meeting
regarding the creation of WDl 70 also state that, pursuant to the W &SR Agreement, "IDWR
must establish [the] Upper Salmon Water District." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 628, 635) (emphasis added).
Public testimony confirms these representations by the Department. Written testimony
submitted to the Director by Mr. Jack Challis states that Director Tuthill and Department
employee Tim Luke presented slides at the October 24 meeting "outlining the necessity for an
Upper Salmon Water District Watermaster to oversee this new district." (R., Vol. 3,
pp. 485, 486) (emphasis added). According to Mr. Challis, those slides described the new water
district as an "obligation ... to which [the Department] must comply in order to meet conditions
of the Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement ...." Id. (emphasis added). Based on these
representations, the Director and the Department cannot reasonably deny their belief that they
were required to create WD 170 by the W&SR Agreement. They also cannot deny that these
representations had convinced affected water users that creation of WD 170 was required.
There are other examples in the administrative record demonstrating the Director's belief
that the W &SR Agreement required him to create WDl 70. Finding of Fact 4 in the WDl 70
Order describes the two Salmon River water rights that the Forest Service obtained in the SRBA
pursuant to the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 565, 566.) If the Director was not
relying upon the W &SR Agreement when he created WD 170, there would be no need for this
reference to appear in the WD 170 Order. This information is otherwise irrelevant to whether a
new water district is required in Basins 71 and 72-areas that do not actually encompass the two
Forest Service Salmon River water rights, which are located many miles farther downstream.
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These examples demonstrate that the Director had already decided to create WD 170 prior
to the hearing on the matter. This rendered him a biased decision-maker under Eacret because
he "[h]ad already made up his ... mind regarding the outcome of the hearing." 139 Idaho
at 785-786, 86 P .3d at 499-500. Under Eacret, this is a Due Process violation.
While this Court has stated that the right to an unbiased decision maker "does not mean
having 'no preconceptions on legal issues,'" it has also stated that the decision maker must be
"willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain [] open to persuasion,
when the issues arise in a pending case." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144
Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840,846 (2007) (citation omitted). The record in this matter certainly
does not demonstrate that the Director was "open to persuasion" on the propriety of creating
WDl 70. As this Brief will demonstrate below, nearly all of the testimony at the hearing was

against the creation of WD 170.
There is another reason the Director's predetermination violated Due Process. This
premature determination materially and improperly prejudiced the subsequent administrative
proceedings, because the water user public did not have any incentive to provide input to the
Department during the administrative process. As the public testimony demonstrates, to the
members of the public and the affected water users, creation of the new water district was
already an inevitability based on the Department's statements, and the hearing and solicitation of
feedback was simply a meaningless formality.'

5

Meaningful participation by "all interested persons" in a water district hearing is
essential to satisfy due process. See Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94, 558 P.2d at 1055. There is no
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A good example of this chilling effect appears in the hearing transcript itself. During his
testimony at the hearing, Mr. Jack Challis testified that, "the majority realize, like it or not, the
now finalized Wild and Scenic Rivers Agreement has made this proposed new district

mandatory." (R., Vol. 2, p. 352, LL. 62-64) (emphasis added). (See also, R., Vol. 3, pp. 48586) (describing WDl 70 as an "obligation ... to which [the Department] must comply in order to
meet conditions of the Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement").
According to his testimony, Mr. Challis is not only a water right owner, but also the
secretary-treasurer for two water districts and both a former and current watermaster.
(R., Vol. 2, p. 351, LL. 34-38.) His experience provided Mr. Challis with a level of
sophistication in Idaho water law above most water right owners. If Mr. Challis was under the
impression that WDl 70 is indeed "mandatory," how many other non-testifying water right
owners were operating under the same erroneous assumption? How many would have testified
or commented on the need for the new water district had they known it was not in fact
mandatory? Unfortunately, we will never know, because the Department consistently asserted
that the creation ofWD! 70 was "mandatory," as Mr. Challis stated. (R., Vol. 2, p. 352, L. 64.)
The misinformation consistently disseminated by the Department unquestionably tainted the
process and cast a cloud of inevitability over the statutory procedure which mandates openness,
fairness, and objectivity.

way of determining how many "interested persons" did not testify because of the misinformation
disseminated by Department personnel that the W&SR Agreement required the Director to create
WD170.
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C.

The Administrative Record Does Not Contain Substantial Evidence That WD170 Is
"Required In Order To Properly Administer Uses Of The Water Resource"
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "not supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole." LC.§ 67-5279(3)(d). Under Idaho law, a water
district may be created only when it is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water
resource." I.C. § 42-604 ,r 2. Accordingly, in order to uphold the Director's decision, this Court
must find substantial evidence in the record that WDI 70 was in fact "required in order to
properly administer uses of the water resource."
However, the administrative record contains virtually no such evidence. Rather, the
primary bases relied upon by the Director are either not relevant to the determination required by
Section 42-604 or are conclusory statements unsupported by record evidence. As such, the
Director's decision is not "supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole" and,
therefore, is in error under the Idaho APA. LC. § 67-5279(3)(d). This error prejudiced
Thompson Creek, because it results in the creation ofWDl 70--an action which Thompson
Creek opposes due in part to the extra costs that will be required to fund WD 170 operations.

1.

The Director Improperly Relied Upon Several Items In Creating WD170

The Director justified creating WD 170 by relying upon several items not relevant to the
mandatory standard in Section 42-604. Similarly, the Director relied upon factual statements not
supported by the administrative record. Accordingly, before discussing the evidence in the
record that is relevant to the determination required by Section 42-604, it is important to discuss
the items that should not have been considered in that determination.
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a.

The Director Improperly Relied Upon The W&SR Agreement

This Brief has already established the Director believed the W&SR Agreement required
him to create WDI 70. Importantly, the provision in the W&SR Agreement "requiring" the
Department to create WD 170 is not relevant to whether the new water district is "required"
pursuant to Section 42-604, ,i 2. The Director did not have the authority to create WD 170 prior
to completing the statutorily required administrative process. And, the fact that the State of
Idaho "agreed" to create the new water district in the W &SR Agreement is not the type of
"requirement" contemplated by Section 42-604. In order to create a new water district, the
Director must demonstrate that it is "required" for the proper administration of the water
resource, not that it is required pursuant to an agreement executed prior to the mandated
statutory administrative process. See I.C. § 42-604, ,i 2. Accordingly, the provision of the
W &SR Agreement "requiring" the Department to create WDI 70 is not rc:cord evidence
supporting the Director's formation of the new water district.
In addition to this statutory argument, terms of the W&SR Agreement itself demonstrate
that the Agreement is not relevant to whether the creation ofWDI 70 is legal and appropriate.'
For example, Paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement states that, "nothing in this Stipulation ... shall
be construed or interpreted ... to limit or affect the authority of ... the State provided by statute
or regulation." (R., Vol. 4, p. 728) (emphasis added). Moreover, Paragraph 10 provides that,
"nothing in this Stipulation ... shall be ... used as evidence ... in any appellate proceedings

6

Again, Thompson Creek is not a party to that Agreement and is accordingly not
obligated by its terms.
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concerning the SRBA, or in any other proceeding, other than those seeking approval of the
[W&SR Order], for interpretation, enforcement or administration of this Stipulation or the Partial
Decrees .... " (R., Vol. 4, pp. 728-29.) This wording was specifically confirmed by the SRBA
Court in the W&SR Order. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 781, 783.)
In other words, the W &SR Agreement contains specific provisions restricting its use in
subsequent proceedings. These provisions conclusively preserve the applicability of
Section 42-604 and its statement that a new water district must be "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource." Accordingly, the W &SR Agreement's "requirement"
that the Director create WD 170 is not relevant.
Significantly, the Director also could not properly rely upon the W &SR Agreement in
creating WD 170 because the SRBA Court's W&SR Order approving the Agreement specifically
prohibits the Director from relying on the water administration provisions in Paragraph 2 of the
Agreement in determining whether a new water district is "required" pursuant to Section 42-604.
In its order approving the W&SR Agreement, the SRBA Court specifically states that:
The [W&SR Agreement] is hereby approved, provided, that the provisions
of paragraph 2 of the [Agreement] ("paragraph 2") that address
administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties
only and shall not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with
regard to administration of water rights by IDWR.
(R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). That Order goes on to provide that:
The provisions of paragraph 2 [of the W&SR Agreement] shall not affect
the rights of Thompson Creek or any other non-signatory party to
participate in and object to any ... proceeding for creation of a water
district. .. ; nor shall the provisions ofparagraph 2 affect the disposition
or review of such proceedings.
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(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83) (emphasis added).
This language explicitly establishes that the W&SR Agreement may not provide a basis
for forming a new water district, and that the creation of WD 170 must still be "required"
pursuant to Section 42-604, ,r 2.

b.

The Director Improperly Relied Upon The Previous Adjudication Of
Water Rights

When he created WDl 70, the Director incorrectly believed the previous adjudication of
water rights within Basins 71 and 72 justified the creation of a water district in those areas.
However, the previous adjudication of water rights is simply a prerequisite to-not a justification
for-water district formation.
Conclusion of Law 20 of the WD 170 Order states that, "Idaho Code § 42-604 authorizes
the Director to create a water district for streams or water supplies for which a court having
jurisdiction thereof has adjudicated the priorities of appropriation." (R., Vol. 3, p. 575)
( emphasis added). This statement implies that, by itself, the adjudication of water rights in
Basins 71 and 72 is a sufficient basis for the Director to create a new water district. However,
this is not the correct construction of the water district statutes.
While adjudication of water rights may be a required prerequisite to creation of a water
district under Section 42-604, it does not provide the Director with the authority to create a new
water district. Rather, the creation ofWDl 70 must still be "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource." LC. § 42-604, ,r 2 (emphasis added). Adjudication of
water rights alone is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria for creation of a water district.
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More is needed. Otherwise, the language of Section 42-604 serves no purpose. Under
the Director's interpretation, adjudication of water rights automatically justifies creation of a
water district. If the Legislature had intended such a process, the statutes would so provide.
They do not. Instead, the Legislature established a standard that must be satisfied to create a
water district: it must be "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
Id. (emphasis added).

c.

The Director Improperly Relied Upon Interim Administration

A similar analysis applies to the Director's reliance upon interim administration to justify
creating WDl 70. Interim administration allows the Department to distribute water and protect
senior water rights in a particular basin after water rights have been adjudicated, but before the
Director has determined whether a water district is required. See, generally, I.C. § 42-1417. As
its name implies, it is an "interim" measure and is subject to a relaxed standard compared to the
formation of a water district. A water district must be "required." I.C. § 42-604, ,r 2. Interim
administration need only be "reasonably necessary." Id. at§ 42-1417(2)(c).
Conclusion of Law 23 of the WDl 70 Order states that, "Idaho Code§ 42-1417 ...
clearly authorizes the Director to create a water district after the entry of the district court's order
for interim administration .... " (R., Vol. 3, p. 575.) This statement incorrectly implies that
interim administration alone is sufficient to form a water district. If a water district is to be
formed after interim administration is judicially approved, the district still must be "required"
pursuant to Section 42-604. The interim administration statute states that, "[a]fter entry of the
district court's order for interim administration, the director may form a water district pursuant
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to chapter 6, title 42, Idaho Code." LC. § 42-1417(4) (emphasis added). This provision
specifically incorporates the "required" standard of Section 42-604. Section 42-1417(4)'s
statement that the Director may form a water district, "[a]fter entry of the district court's order
for interim administration," does not provide the Director with independent authority to form a
water district as the Director implies. Instead, Section 42-1417 simply describes the sequence of
events that may occur if the statutorily mandated due process procedures are properly completed.

d.

The Director Improperly Relied Upon Matters Outside The
Administrative Record

In creating WDl 70, the Director may not rely upon his own conclusory statements of
fact, unsupported by the administrative record. The Idaho AP A specifically provides that,
"[f]indings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence in the record of the contested case
and on matters officially noticed in that proceeding." LC.§ 67-5248(2) (emphasis added). And,
the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically stated that, "[a]ny findings made by [an administrative
agency] based on matters outside the record must be reversed as unsupported by substantial,
competent evidence or as arbitrary and capricious." Laurino v. Bd. ofProf'! Discipline ofIdaho

State Bd. ofMed., 137 Idaho 596,601, 51 P.3d 410,415 (Idaho 2002); see also Sanders Orchard
v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840,847 (Idaho 2002). The WD170 Order
demonstrates the Director relied heavily upon factual statements unsupported by the
administrative record.
To be clear, the Department may rely upon its water resource expertise in administrative
proceedings. Administrative agencies are expressly permitted by Idaho law to take official
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notice of matters that are within their area of expertise. However, to take notice of such matters,
an agency is required to notify the parties to the proceeding of the facts or material to be noticed,
before or during the hearing, and prior to any order based on the noticed facts.
LC.§§ 67-5249(2)(c); 67-5251(4). See also Sanders, 137 Idaho at 702, 52 P.3d at 847 (holding
that an unsupported finding of fact that a proposed subdivision was in an area of increasing
residential development was not supported by substantial evidence).
Here, the Director did not officially notice any factual matters prior to or during the
hearing. Accordingly, the Director may not rely upon factual matters discussed in the WDJ 70
Order unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. An administrative
agency:
may not use its expertise as a substitute for evidence in the record, since
the requirement for administrative decisions based on substantial evidence
and reasoned findings-which provide the basis for effective judicial
review-would become meaningless if material facts known to or relied
upon the agency did not appear in the record.

Laurino, 137 Idaho at 602, 51 P.3d at 416 (footnotes omitted).
Importantly, the WDJ 70 Order is full of examples of the Director's reliance upon factual
matters not contained in the administrative record. For example, Conclusion of Law 7 in the
WD 170 Order states that the Director specifically relied upon "historic records of the water
districts in Basins 72, 73, 74, and 75 on file at the Department" in concluding that "some or
many of the statutory requirements are not being satisfied [in the Upper Salmon River Basin]."
(R., Vol. 3, p. 572.) Conclusion of Law 7 also lists conduct that purportedly justifies creation of

the water district. It states:
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For example, surface water diversions in some of the existing districts lack
adequate measuring devices and controlling headgates, are not measured
or recorded on a regular basis, or are not monitored or regulated during
portions of the irrigation season. Additionally, some of the existing water
districts do not maintain adequate measurement records, annual
watermaster reports are not always complete or timely submitted, and
some existing water districts have been inactive for many years. None of
the existing water districts enforce limitations of surface water rights
outside of the irrigation season for the rights, and none of the existing
water districts regulate water rights diverting from ground water.
(R., Vol. 3, p. 572.)
The Director made similar statements regarding the effectiveness of the existing water
districts within Basin 72 in Finding of Fact 12 of the WD170 Order. (R., Vol. 3, p. 567.)
Moreover, Conclusion of Law 8 in the WD170 Order states that, "the administration of surface
water rights in the existing water districts in Basin 72 is often inconsistent." (R., Vol. 3, p. 572.)
Remarkably, the Director did not officially notice any of this factual information pursuant
to Section 67-5251, and there is no factual support for these assertions in the administrative
record. Such conclusory, unsupported statements do not provide the Director with a legitimate
basis for creating the water district.

2.

The Remainder Of The Record Must Contain Substantial Evidence That A
New Water District Is "Required In Order To Properly Administer Uses Of
The Water Resource"

The applicable standard, Section 42-604, unambiguously states that creation of a water
district must be "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource."
LC.§ 42-604, ,r 2 (emphasis added). However, the WDl 70 Order specifically states that, "[t]he
Director proposes creation of a water district in Basins 71 and 72 for efficient administration of
surface and ground water rights." (R., Vol. 3, p. 575) (emphasis added). This wrongly
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characterizes the statutory standard. Simply promoting "efficient administration" does not
satisfy the statutory mandate of Section 42-604. And, even if it did, there is simply no evidence
in the record supporting the assertion that WDl 70 will promote "efficient administration."
The statute's use of the term "required" is deliberate. The Idaho Legislature determined
that creation of water districts would result in the imposition of significant costs and restrictions
on water users. It used the term "required" to ensure these governmental burdens would not be
imposed unless there was a legitimate, demonstrated imperative. It is not sufficient that a water
district may make the administration of water rights more efficient. Had the Legislature intended
a lower standard to govern the creation of water districts or to give the Director more discretion
in this determination, it would have done so. See, e.g., LC. §§ 42-237a ("the director of the
department of water resources in his sole discretion, is empowered .... ") (emphasis added),
42-247 ("[t]he director of the department may also in his discretion give notice .... ") (emphasis
added); see also I.C. §§ 42-351(3), 42-502, 42-1701A(2), 42-2013. Rather, as Section 42-604
unambiguously states, a new water district must be "required in order to properly administer
uses of the water resource." (Emphasis added).
Significantly, the Department should not be entitled to any deference on the interpretation
of Section 42-604 pursuant to the Idaho cases addressing judicial deference to an agency's
interpretation of statutes it administers.' Those cases hold an agency's interpretation of statutes

7

Notably, this is not the first time this Court has addressed the legality of the
Department's interpretation and implementation of the water district statutes. In DeRousse v.
Higginson, this Court rejected the Department's attempt to administer unadjudictated water
rights through water districts. 95 Idaho 173, 505 P.2d 321 (1973). The Department took the
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is entitled to deference only when the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Matter ofPermit

No. 36-7200 in Name ofIdaho Dep't ofParks and Recreation, 121 Idaho 819,824,828 P.2d
848, 853 (Idaho 1992). Section 42-604 is unambiguous in its statement that the creation of a
new water district must be "required." Any interpretation of that statute involving a standard less
exacting than "required" contradicts the unambiguously expressed intent of the Idaho Legislature
and is accordingly not entitled to any judicial deference. 8
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court concluded that Section 42-604 is an
ambiguous statute. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 986, 988-90.) According to the district court, the word
"required" used in that statute "yields multiple meanings upon which reasonable minds may
differ," because the Merriam Webster dictionary contains multiple definitions of that term which
differ as to their degree of necessity. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 989-90.) Thompson Creek believes this
conclusion of ambiguity is in error.
First, it is important to note that "(a]mbiguity is not established merely because the
parties present differing [statutory] interpretations to the court." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho
471,476, 163 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the fact that Thompson

position that it could administer unadjudicated water rights, despite the fact that the Idaho
Legislature had recently revised the water district statutes to exclude unadjudicated water rights.
95 Idaho at 175,505 P.2d at 323. In Nettleton v. Higginson, this Court rejected the Department's
attempt to combine two water districts into one water district without undergoing the required
notice and hearing process. 98 Idaho at 94,558 P.2d at 1055.
8

Additionally, the Director has the authority to adopt administrative rules and
regulations interpreting statutory enactments. LC.§§ 42-603, 42-1805(8). He has neglected to
utilize that authority here and is therefore not entitled to "Chevron-style deference" in his
interpretation of Section 42-604. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,587 (2000).
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Creek and the Director offer differing interpretations of Section 42-604 does not necessarily
mean that the statute is ambiguous.
In addition, the fact that the term "required" has multiple definitions that vary as to the
degree of necessity should not be sufficient to establish ambiguity. Thompson Creek submits
that virtually every statute contains words that are capable of multiple, similar definitions that
differ only as to degree. Surely, something more is required to establish that a statute is
ambiguous. As this Court has recognized, "a statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute
mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Matter of Permit No. 36-7200 in the Name
of the Idaho Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 121 Idaho 819,823,828 P.2d 848,852 (1992).

Even assuming the district court is correct that "required" in Section 42-604 means "as
suitable" or "as appropriate," this does not end the analysis. As Thompson Creek will explain,
there is a fundamental lack of evidence in the record that WO 170 is "required" for proper water
administration purposes, regardless of which particular variation of the definition of"required" is
used.

3.

The Remainder Of The Administrative Record Does Not Contain Substantial
Evidence That WD 170 Is Required

Under Section 67-5279(3)(d), the Director's decision must be supported by "substantial
and competent evidence." Chisholm v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 142 Idaho 159, 125 P.3d 515,
518 (Idaho 2005). This evidence must be "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." 142 Idaho at 159, 125 P.3d at 520 (citation omitted). This
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evidence need not constitute a preponderance of the evidence, but it must be "more than a mere
scintilla." Id. (citation omitted).
The record in this case simply does not contain "substantial and competent evidence" that
a water district is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." And, the
hearing transcript provides virtually no support for the contention that a new water district is
"required" for this purpose.
To the contrary, most testimony at the hearing was against the creation ofWDl 70. Of
the five witnesses testifying at the November 9, 2005 hearing, four of them specifically
expressed their belief that the new water district was unnecessary. (R., Vol. 2, p. 352,
LL. 61-62) ("many in this proposed district would question any actual needs for such actually
exists" (testimony of Mr. Jack Challis)); (R., Vol. 2, p. 354, L. 113 -p. 355, L. 114) ("we feel
that there is no need for the upper basin watermaster" (testimony of Mr. Jerry Hawkins));
(R., Vol. 2, p. 356, LL. 138-39) ("[i]t just isn't necessary to have another watermaster
mastering something that isn't necessary" (testimony of Mr. Blair Kauer)); (R., Vol. 2, p. 357,

L. 173 - p. 358, L. 185) ("in essence I can't see why we probably need anybody that we don't
presently have in the system already . . . . I think we're way over emphasizing the need down the
road for this fellow that's going to be requiring a lot of money to police us in essence"
(testimony of Mr. James Whittaker)). And, the testimony of the fifth witness at the hearing did
not specifically address the need for WDl 70. (R., Vol. 2, p. 358, L. 201 - p. 359, L. 222.)
Moreover, the remainder of the administrative record contains no valid evidence that
WDI 70 is "required" in accordance with Section 42-604. Rather, the "need" for WDI 70 is
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based almost exclusively on the W &SR Agreement, adjudication, interim administration, and
unsupported factual assertions-none of which are appropriate bases for the creation ofWDI 70,
as this Brief has already explained.
Thompson Creek specifically raised concerns regarding the lack of evidence in the record
in its previous Petition for Reconsideration ofFinal Order Creating Water District No. 170.
(R., Vol. 3, pp. 536-50.) In response to this specific concern raised by Thompson Creek, the
Director does not describe, summarize, or explain any actual evidence of the need for WD170.
Instead, he simply lists a number of documents that he claims support the creation ofWDl 70.
(R., Vol. 3, p. 574.) If those documents contain factual evidence supporting the creation of
WDl 70, the Director should have described that evidence in the WDl 70 Order to justify his
decision and respond to Thompson Creek's concern. It is not sufficient to simply claim that
certain documents support the Director's decision. The findings of fact and the decision must be
based exclusively upon substantial evidence contained in the record. I.C. §§ 67-5248(2),
67-5279(3)(d). Here, the Director simply did not even come close to satisfying these
requirements.
Significantly, the Department did not establish a legal need for WDI 70 based upon lack
of enforcement authority without a new water district. To the contrary, the Department already
has authority to enforce water rights in Basins 71 and 72 under Idaho law. The Idaho Legislature
conferred general water right enforcement authority upon the Department. See, e.g.,
LC. §§ 42-1701B (granting the Director authority to pursue civil enforcement of violations of
state water laws), 42-1805(9) (granting the Director authority to seek injunctive relief against
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those violating state water laws). And, the Director routinely entertains water delivery calls by
senior appropriators against junior appropriators. Accordingly, a water district is not the only
means for the Department to ensure water is distributed in accordance with Idaho law; there are
other legal avenues available.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court only made a passing reference to this
argument, concluding after a brief two-sentence analysis that "[s]ubstantial evidence supported
the Director's order...." (R., Vol. 5, p. 992.) According to the court, "[t]he Director's

Amended Final Order relied on the factual findings from [the Luke Affidavit], the hearing
testimony, and written comments to reach its decision." Id. However, none of these three items
actually support the creation ofWDl 70.
First, as Thompson Creek has explained, nearly all of the "hearing testimony" was

against the creation of WD 170. In addition, the only "written comments" submitted were those
of the Morgan Creek Water District, expressing "concern" about WD170 (R., Vol. 3,
pp. 488-89); and those of Thompson Creek (R., Vol. 4, pp. 638-44) and Jack Challis (R., Vol. 3,
pp. 485-87)-both against the creation ofWDl 70. Therefore, under the district court's analysis,
the Luke Affidavit is the only remaining item in the record potentially supporting the creation of
WD 170. However, it is simply insufficient.
In his response brief to the district court, the Director relies upon the following language
from the Luke Affidavit to support his argument that the creation of WD 170 is supported by
substantial evidence on the record:
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The specific reasons for creation or enlargement of water districts in
Basin 71 and 72 are:
•

Existing water districts in these basins are limited to surface water
sources and do not include ground water sources. Additionally,
some surface water sources in these basins may not be included in
any water district.

•

All of the water rights claimed in Basins 71 and 72 have been
reported or partially decreed in the SRBA as required under
LC.§ 42-1417.

•

Some areas of the basins are in either water measurement districts
or existing water districts, or no district at all. Certain rights and
sources (primarily ground water) within water districts have not
been subject to administration or regulation by the water district,
and measurement districts are limited to measurement and
reporting only, not regulation or enforcement of rights.

•

The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters with
the ability to administer water rights in accordance with the prior
appropriation doctrine as established by Idaho law.

•

The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters the
means to protect senior water rights.

(R., Vol. 5, pp. 895, 917.)
Unfortunately for the Director, however, none of the quoted statements from the Luke
Affidavit actually demonstrate a need for the creation ofWDI 70. In other words, those
statements do not demonstrate that senior water rights are consistently being injured such that a
water district is necessary to protect those rights. Neither do they establish that substantial water
use conflicts have prompted water right holders to request the Department to impose creation of
WDI 70 to "properly administer the uses of the water resource." This Court has stated,
"[s]ubstantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
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to support a conclusion." Curtis v. M H. King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 385, 128 P.3d 920, 922
(Idaho 2005) (citations omitted). Simply put, the above-quoted statements from the Luke
Affidavit do not contain "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support [the]
conclusion" that a water district is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water
resource."
Rather, the purpose of the Luke Affidavit was to support the Department's
commencement of interim administration in Basins 71 and 72. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 381-84.) As
Thompson Creek has explained, the commencement of interim administration is subject to less
stringent legal standards than is the creation of a water district. While the Luke Affidavit may
have been sufficient to support interim administration, it simply does not provide any evidence
that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource," as
Section 42-604 mandates.
To the contrary, the quoted passage from the Luke Affidavit actually highlights the lack
of evidence in the record. It references the fact that some areas within Basins 71 and 72 are in
"water measurement districts." (R., Vol. 2, p. 383.) Generally speaking, the Director can create
a water measurement district in order to measure, catalog, and document water supplies and
diversions within the district. LC. § 42-705.
This begs the question: If the Department has the legal authority to measure water
supplies and diversions, and given that some of the areas within Basins 71 and 72 are in fact
within water measurement districts, then why is there no water measurement data in the record?
Similarly, the record does not contain evidence of any requests from water users within
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Basins 71 and 72 for increased water right administration or any documentation of water delivery
calls that have been initiated in those basins. This is the type of information that the Director
should have relied upon to demonstrate that creation ofWDl 70 is "required in order to properly
administer uses of the water resource." However, no such evidence appears in the record.

D.

The Director's Decision To Include Thompson Creek In WD170 Is Arbitrary And
Capricious Because Thompson Creek Was Not A Party To The W&SR Agreement
This Brief has explained the total lack of evidence in the administrative record

demonstrating that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water
resource," as required by Sections 42-604 and 67-5279(3)(d) of the Idaho Code. In addition, this
Brief demonstrates that the Director's sole basis for creating WD 170 is the W &SR Agreement.
Under these circumstances, even if this Court upholds the Director's creation ofWDl 70, it
should not subject Thompson Creek to the costs and other requirements of the water district.
Again, Thompson Creek was not a party to the W &SR Agreement. In fact, in response
to an objection filed by Thompson Creek, the SRBA Court's order approving the Agreement
specifically provides that, "the provisions of paragraph 2 of the [W&SR Agreement] ... that
address administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties only and shall
not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with regard to administration of water
rights by IDWR." (R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). Paragraph 2 of the Agreement is the
provision that "requires" the Director to create WD! 70. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 714-15.)
This Court has made clear, "[a] stipulation is a contract and its enforceability is
determined by contract principles." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,611, 114
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P.3d 974, 981 (Idaho 2005) (citation omitted). Of course, a non-party is not bound by a contract.
Because Thompson Creek was not a party to the W&SR Agreement, it is not legally bound by
that Agreement and should not be subject to any of the water administration provisions that are a
result of that Agreement, including WDJ 70.
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion." LC. § 67-5279(3)( e). Generally speaking, a decision is "arbitrary" if it is
made "in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented" or "without adequate determining
principles." American Lung Ass 'n ofIdaho/Nevada v. State, Dept. ofAgriculture, 142 Idaho
544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (Idaho 2006). Similarly, a decision is "capricious" ifit is made
without a "rational basis." American Lung, 142 Idaho at 547, 130 P.3d at 1085. And, a decision
is generally an abuse of discretion if the decision-maker (1) did not correctly perceive the issue
as one of discretion; (2) did not act within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with
applicable legal standards; or (3) did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See, e.g.,
Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 768, 86 P.3d 475,482

(Idaho 2004).
Under these circumstances, the Director's inclusion of Thompson Creek within WDl 70
was arbitrary and capricious pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(e). This error
prejudiced Thompson Creek because it resulted in the creation ofWDl 70-an action which
Thompson Creek opposes because of additional governmental restrictions and due to the extra
costs that will be required to fund WDl ?O's operations. Because the W&SR Agreement
provides the only arguable basis for creating WD 170, Thompson Creek must therefore be
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excluded from the water district if this Court affirms the creation of the district by the Director.
This result is dictated both by ordinary contract principles and the specific language of the
judicial order approving the Agreement.

E.

There Is No Statutory Authority For The Creation Of "Sub-Districts"
The WDl 70 Order converts three pre-existing water districts in Basin 72 into "sub-

districts" of WDl 70. (R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) The WDl 70 Order requires these "sub-districts" to
continue to meet annually to elect their own watermasters, adopt their own budgets, select their
own advisory committees, and distribute surface water rights within their boundaries.
(R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) In short, these "sub-districts" are to continue operating as water districts, as
they had in the past.
However, the water district statutes in Title 42, Chapter 6 simply do not contain any
provisions allowing for the creation of"sub-districts." Rather, the Director may only "create" a
new water district, "revise the boundaries of' an existing water district, "abolish" an existing
water district," or "combine two (2) or more water districts" into one water district.
LC. § 42-604, ,r 2. Nowhere in this language is there any authorization for "sub-districts."
Important in this regard is the fact that, as a state agency, the Department and its Director only
have those authorities that have been specifically granted by the Idaho Legislature. See, e.g.,
Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514,915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Idaho 1996); Simpson v.
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212,998 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Idaho 2000).
Presumably, the Director relies upon the authority in Section 42-604 to "combine" two or
more water districts as the basis for "sub-districts." However, by its plain language, that
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provision simply allows the Director to convert two or more pre-existing water districts into one
water district. It does not provide any authority for the two-tiered "sub-district" structure created
by the Director, in which there are multiple mini-water districts within a larger "umbrella" water
district.
And, there are a number of problems with this two-tiered structure that illustrate
Thompson Creek's prejudice. First, these "sub-districts" are still subject to the authority of
WDl 70 and its watermaster, as the WDl 70 Order does not abrogate the authority ofWDl 70
over water users within those three pre-existing water districts. This essentially creates a twotiered authority structure in which the water users within the "sub-districts" are required to
continue to spend the time and money required to operate entities that are ultimately subject to
the authority ofWDl 70.
And, because of this structure, affected water users within these "sub-districts" are
subject to assessments from both the "sub-districts" and from WD 170. Conclusion of Law 31 (f)
in the WDl 70 Order specifically states that, "sub-districts may collect assessments to pay the
pro-rata expenses of the Upper Salmon Water District. ... " (R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) Similarly,
Conclusion of Law 9 of the WD 170 Order specifies that, "each sub-district may be subject to
future assessments for costs associated with oversight of that sub-district," and goes on to
enumerate a number of different items that qualify as "oversight costs." (R., Vol. 3, pp. 572-73.)
Simply put, the water district statutes in Title 42, Chapter 6 of the Idaho Code contain no
authority for this two-tiered, "sub-district" structure. And, they certainly do not contain authority
for assessments by any entity other than a water district. While Section 42-604 provides for
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combining multiple water districts into one water district, this is different than the two-tiered
authority structure involved with the Director's "sub-district" arrangement.
By creating these "sub-districts" without authority to do so, the Director's actions were
"in violation of ... statutory provisions" and were "in excess of the statutory authority of the
[Department]" and were, accordingly, in violation of the Idaho APA. See l.C. § 67-5279(3)(a),

(b) (emphasis added).
VI.
CONCLUSION
The Record before this Court demonstrates numerous procedural and substantive
violations of Idaho law by the Director. Despite the clear authority, the Director plunged
forward to create WD 170 because the W &SR Agreement "required" him to do so. Due Process,
statutory criteria, evidence in the record, concerns of actual people with actual private property
rights, did not cause him to waiver or objectively consider these matters. Instead, he knew what
the W &SR Agreement "required" him to do and he did it.
His decision to create WDl 70 violates Thompson Creek's constitutional Due Process
rights, is not based upon substantial evidence in the record, and does not comply with Idaho's
water district statutes. As such, the Director's decision to create WDl 70 violates multiple
provisions of the Idaho AP A. Therefore, this Court should reverse the Director's decision to
create WD 170. However, if this Court affirms the creation of WD 170, then it should order that
Thompson Creek be specifically excluded from this district.
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STATE OF IDAUO'S RESPONSE MEMORANDiJM TO
THE UNITED STATES/THOMPSON CUEK
MOTION TO APPROVE STIPULATION

INTRODUCTION
This memorandum responds lo the stipulation proposed by tlle Uni

Thompson Creek Mining Company ("Stipulation"). The state of Idaho does

States and

ndt oppose the

settlement efforts of the United States and Thompson Creek Mining C~mpany and
acknowledges that Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 ("Rule 408·) suppli~

J

appropriate

framework for determining whether evidence of a settlement agreement Is admiss1h1e in a court
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proceeding. However, provision four of the Stipulatlon appc11rs to overreach' the cope of Rule
I

408 by uslna !he rule as a preemptive tool against challenges In future court !proceedings..
I

Therefore, the State respectfully suggests tliat provision four of the Sdpulat16n iJ rejected and
!'

:

that the court simply order that subsc:quern use of the Stipulation will be governed ~Y Rule 408.
I
The proposed Stipulation provides, In part, that nothing in the Stiplilation or Its
I

M&Otlations may be construed as admissions against Interest or used as evldencd to show !he •

l

validity or invalidity of the stipulating parties' claims, by any party ln the SRBA and related
procccdlnas. Stipulation And Joint Motion For Order Approvlna Stipulatloil

J Dismissing

Objections, at 4. .Accordingly, the United States and Thompson Creek Minfug chmpany have
'
requested an order from this coun to prevent any party from Introducing ithc !tipulatlon as

evidence in a later court proceedlne. Id. at 5. Rule 408, however, docs not ~ t the court ·
to prejudge whether any proposed use of the stipulation is precluded at this time. )Rather, such
a decision must be made at the time the stipulation is offered into evidence.· Wblte the United

'
Slates and Thompson Creek Mining Company acknowledge that the Stipulation could be
'

challenged "for a pllfPOSe contemplated by Rule 408," id. at 5, the broad lai!guage of the

i

Stipulation and scope of tho rc:quested order appear to confllct with this sraterncnt.1
. I

II.

I

TllE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE AND IDAHO C~ LAW
CONTEMPLATE A CASE-BY-CASE DETERMINATION OF iWHETHER

SETILEMENT EVIDENCB IS ADMISSWLE.

i

.

Rule 408 olltlines circumstances under whlcll evidence of a scttlcdicnt
negotiations may or may not be admissible. It states:

:

b

j

.

settlement ·

Evidence of (1) l\lmishlng, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2)! ace pting,
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed either as to vali4ity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount ;of the
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or st.atements made in
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u

compromial: negotiations is llkewise not admissible. Tl1iS mle does not ,quire
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because i it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule docs not re/quire
exclusion if the evidence is offered for another plllpo&e, sucb as provinf: bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a conrontion of Wldue delay. or provibg an
effort lo obstruct
criminal investigation
prosccution,
llllS.
• e
negotiations encompass mediation;
i

a

or

CoJmr·

ldabo R. Bvld. 408. By its own u,nns, Rule 408 does not exclude evld

_

•

·

.

. relating :to

settlements when the evidence is offered to show bias or prejudice. Id,; sec 'also.I Davidson v.

Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109, 153 P.2d 1253, 1255 (1987); Soria v, Sierra PJ(tlc Airlines,

, I

.

Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 605, 726 P.2d 706, 717 (1986). Similarly, the Idaho Silprc$e Court has
determined that the rule does not eirelude evidence of inconsistent Statemen~ fro~ seulemcnt

negotiations, noting that the rule's list of admissible evidence relating to setttbment is not ·
exhaustive. Davidson, 114 Idaho at 109, 7S3 P.2d at 1255.

j

Consequently, the cirCIIIDlltances under which settlement evidence• ma ·. be deemed

admissible or inadmissible do not arise 11ntll the settlement evidence has ktilally been
i

.

proffered. At that time, it is appropriate for a trial court lo consider whethet, un~er Rule 408,

the proffered evidence Is admissible. A trial court has broad discretion to dctcnbne wh0thcr

lease. Soria, .
; i
Ill Idaho at 606, 726 P.2d at 718; Dory v. Blshara, 123 Idaho 329, 335, 848 P.2d 387, 393

settlement evidence ls admissible in light of the facts and Issues presented bl. the

(1992).

Moreover, when determining whether settlement evidence is admis~ble,. a trial court
i

must balance the probative value of 1h11 proffered evidence against any unfait !prejudice, in

accordance with Idaho Rule ofEVidence 403. Davidson, 114 Idaho at 110,753 ~.2d at 12S6;
'
j'
.
Soria, 111 Idaho at 606, 726 P.2d at 718, The probative value of the protTeted evi!lence (e.;.,
!

the evidence of settlement) ts measurccl by the degree of relevance and 'matelriality of the
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evidence and the necessity of the evidence for the Issue on which it is

lntroduc

David3dn, ·

114 Idaho at 110, 753 P,2d at 1256. The coun welahs this value against any uJ1r prejudice,

conslderina whether the evidence will be giVen undue weight or will result

~ an kequity.
'

Id.

"Only after usina this balancing test, may a trial judge use bis discretion to pro rly admit 'or '
exclude the proffered evidence." Id. ·

An order precluding future use of the proposed Stipulation to cballtinge ontradictdry
statements and other similar circumstances would, in effect, eliminate the broad iscrctlon and
balancing duties of the court presented with the evidence.

m.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the state of Idaho respectfully requests this court .to limit ally
l

approval of the Stipulation And Joint Motion For Order Approving Stipulatlcin A.Jld
Dismissing
I
.
I
.
Objections with the proviso that later attempt! to use th.e. Stipulation as· evidence will be
governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. The State further requests this

coJ

to deny the
I
Stipulation's fourth provision, and the corresponding request for an order ebforcing that

provision, which states that nothing in the Stipulation or its negotiations may

bJ consuued as

admissions against interest or used as evidence to show the validity or invalidity f the United
StateS' claims, by any party in the SRBA and related proceedings,
DATED this 12" day of Jlllle 1998.

ALAN G. LANCE
Attorney General

Deputy Attorney General
Nalllrlll Resources Division
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this /4-1(., day of June 1998, I caused to be sc~ed a copy of ~e ·
foreaoing STATE OF IDAHO'S RESi'ONSE MEMORANDUM TO ~ umTED ·
STATES/THOMPSON CREEK MOTION TO APPROVlll STIPULATION b' U.S. Mall,
postage prepaid to the addressees on the following court lists:
'

Court Certificate of Mailing for MUSYA Claims (Consolidated Subcasc
63-25239) dated June 2, 1998.
Court Certificate of Mailing for Wild & Scenic Claims (Consolidated ~b se
75-13316) dated June 2, 1998.
Court Certificate of Mailing for Wilderness NRA (Consolidated SUbcrise 7 •
13605) dated June 2, 1998.

ORAH E. NELSON
Deputy Attorney General
pll61nnt.doc
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Court Certificate of MalUng for Wild and Scenic RiWI' Claims
Consolldated Subcase: 75-13316
Director ofIDWR
POBox83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0098

William K. Fletcher
Fletcher Law Office
POBox248
Blll'lcy, ID 83318-0248

Chief, Natural Resources
Division

Office of Attorney Gene?al

Roger D, Ling

State of Idaho

Ling Nielsen & Robinson
POBox396

P0Box44449

Rupert, ID 83350

P. 007

TEL:208 334 2690

John T. Sob oeder

Schroeder Lozuniz
POBox267
Boise, ID d101

Tenyt.~·na
JR Simplot ompany
P0Box27
Boise, ID Sl 707

Boise, ID 8371 1-4449

U.S. Dept of Justice
Environment & Natural
Resource$ Division
SSO W Fort St, MSC 033
Boise, ID 83 724
Josephine P. Beeman
Beeman & Hofstetter
PO Box 1427
Boise, ID 83701-1427
Scott L. Campbell
Elam&Burke
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83 70 I
Gary A. Demott
c/o 9185 Colleen
Boise, ID 83 709

Jeffery C. Fereday
Givens Pursley, LLP
P0Box2720
Boise, ID 83701

Ronald T. Schindler
Thomas E. Root

J. Frederick Mack
Munay D, Feldman
Holland & Hurt
POBox2527
Boise, ID 83 70 l

MicWIMi~dc
Bogle & OlltCS PLLC
Two Union lsquare
601 Union Street
,
Seattle WA198101-2346

Don A. Olowinsld
Hawley, Troxell Ennis &
Hawley
PO Box 1617
T:loise, ID 83701

RWRettig
Rettla & Rosenbeny
POBox729

Caldwell, ID 83605

RayW,Riaby
R.igby Thatcher Andrus
Rigby Kam & Moeller
P0Box2S0
Rexburg, ID 83440
John A. Rosholt
James C. Tucker
Rosholt Robertson & Tucker
PO Box 1906
Twin Falls. ID 83 303-1906

Root & Schiru:ller
4IO 17th Street, Suite 840
Denver, CO 80202

popl
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Court Certificate of Ma!Jtng for Wfldernm Claims
Consolidated Subcase: 75-131105

Chief, Natural Resources
Division
Office of Attorney General
State ofldabo
POBox44449
Boise. ID 83711-4449
U.S. Dept of Justice
Environment & Nalllral
Resources Division
550 W Fort St, MSC 033
Boise, ID 83 724

Clayton M. Badley
1220 East l 0th North
Mountain Rome, ID 83647
Jerry W. Badley
POBox601
Willows, CA 95988

June2,lBBB

Joffiey C. Femiay
Givens Pursley, LLP
PO Boic2720
Boise, TD 83701

John T. S edcr
Schroeder &! Lezamiz
POBox267!
Boise, ID
l

William K. Fletcher
POBox248
Burley, ID 83318-0248

TcnyT; Uhl e
JR Shnplot C1ompany

Roger O. Ling
Lins Nielsen & Robinson
POBox396
Rupert, ID 83350
Don A. Olowinski

83L~o

POBox27 I
Boise, ID
07

83F

Michael Minlnde
Bogle &. Oat~ PLLC
Two Union Square
601 Union S cct
Seattle WA 8101-2346

Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley
PO Box 1617
Boise, IO 83701

HWRcttig
PO Box 729
CQJdwell, ID 83605

Josephine P. Beeman
Bceman & Hofstetter
PO Box 1427
Boise, ID 83701-1421

RayW.Rigby
Rigby Thatcher Andrus Rigby
I<am & Moeller
POBox2SO
Rexburg, ID 83440

Scott L. Campbell
El11111 & Burke
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

John A. Rosholt
Rosholt Robertson & Tucker
PO Box 1906
Twin Palls, ID 83303

Gary Demott
C/O 9185 Colleen

Ronald E. Schindler
Thomas E. Root
Root & Schindler
41 O 17th Street Ste. 840
Denver, CO 80202

Boise, ID 83 709

00...:..8_ _
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Dlreotor ofIDWR
POBox83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0098

P.

p,a• I

.·: JU~. -12' 98IPRI) 08:47

ATT. GEN. NATURAL RESOURCES

~ Certificate ofMalJlng fo~A Claims
ConsoUdated Subcase: 63-2$239
Director ofIDWR
POBox83720
Boise, ID 83720-0098

Sally Dahl
POBox296
Challis, ID 83226

Chief, Nat'I Resources Div
Office: of Attorney General
State of Idaho

Gary A. Demott
c/o 9185 Colleen
Boise, ID 83 709

POBol<44449
Boise, ID 83711-4449

U.S. Dept of Justice
Environment & Natural
· Rcsolll'Ces Dlvlvision
550 W Fort St. MSC 033
Boise, ID 83724
Clayton M. Badley
1220 East loth North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Jerry W. Badley

POBox601
Willows, CA 95988
Josephine P. l3eeman
Beeman & Hofstetter
PO Box 1427
Boise, ID 83701-1427

Scott L. Campbell
Elam & Buike
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Challls Inigation CO.
POBox71
Challis, ID 83226
Howard Cutlc:r
HC 67 Box 2066
Challis, ID 83226

.Willis & Belly Deveny
PO Box 1160
Riggins, ID 83549
Jeffrey C. Fereday
Givens Pursley, LLP
POBox2720
Boise, ID 83701
William K. Fletcher
Fletcher Law Office
POBox248
Burley, ID 83318-0248
Gary & Elaine Funck
POBox858
Challis, ID 83226

Harold Horton
PO Box 1089
Challis, ID 83226
Jose Ditch Company
Thomas V. McGowan
PO ao x 1040
Challis, ID 83226
Gary Kimble
PO13ox 568
Challis, ID 83226
Doyle & Jud! Leuzinger
HC 67 l3ox 208S
Challis, ID 83226

P. 009
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JunJ 2, '1998

Roger D. L 11

, ,

Ling Nic:lseJi & Robinson

PO8ox396!
Rupert, JD E3SO

·

Ted & HeliMalone
HC63 Box 749
Challis, ID 8 226
'
JayC.Ne
!
S821 Mo
Dove Dr
Nampa., ID 3686
:

.

I

Don A. OlovWnksl

;
Hawley
I Ennis &
Hawley
,
PO Box 161
:
Boise, ID 831701

Tror'

HWRettig
Rettig & Ro cnbcrry
POBox729
Caldwell, ID 83605

RayW.Rlg
Rigby Thate r Andrus '
Rigby
& Moeller
PO8ox2S0I
.
Rcxbllt'8, 1D 183440-0250

ajngcrt

,

Willlam' F.
Rin&ert Clar)t. Chartered'
POBox277j
,

Boise, ID

sl:~

Ronald I. S

lcr

Thomas E. Rpot
Root & Schbidlcr
41017thStr'et, St840'
Denver, CO 0202

pep I on

i

, . J,U~.

·12' 98IPRI) 08:47

ATT. GEN. NATURAL RESOURCES

TEL:208 334 2690

· :P. 010---

John A. Rosholt
J!lllles C. Tucker
Rosholt Robertson & Tucker
PO Box l!l06
Twin Falls, ID 83301-1906

Bruce M. Smith
Rosholt Robemon & Tucker
PO Box2139
Boise, ID 83701-2139
Terry T, Uhling
JR Simplot Compqny
P0Box27
Boise, ID 83 707

Madee E. YacomeU11
PO Box SI
Challis, ID 83226

Michael Mirancle
Bogle & Oates PLLC
Two Union Square
601 Union Street
Seattle WA 98101-2346
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